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Improving the Management of
Environmental Health
by Lester B. Lave*
Environmental health regulation has been developed on the premise that both problems and solutions
are obvious, requiring only attention and commitment. The result has been impossible legislative goals
and frenetic, unfocused agency efforts to deal with too many issues. Preventing all environmental health
problems is impossible and not the best approach; instead, attention ought to be shifted toward reacting
quickly to problems before irreversible, severe health damage has occurred. Ratherthan havingregulatory
agencies attempt to manage all problems, they should be focused on exemplifying goals and productive
approaches, and on handling a few major issues. Regulatory agencies should be managing the nonregu-
latory institutions to ensure that they are effective in dealing with the myriad issues that the agencies
will never be able to handle. The inherent limitations of federal regulatory agencies must be recognized
to restructure environmental health management to be more effective in lowering risks while being effi-
cient, administratively simple, and more equitable.
Thehistoryofenvironmentalhealthproblems isgrim.
Workers laboredindustclouds ofasbestos, cotton, coal,
or silica so thick they could barely see a few feet. A
large proportion ofthe Japanese living in a community
died or suffered severe neural damage from eating fish
containing mercury. Hundreds ofthousands of London
residents became ill and 4,000 died during the London
fog episode in 1952.
I don't mean to suggest that severe environmental
health problems were the norm. However, when they
occurred they were obvious and devastating. Ourthink-
ing is colored by this history, and our legislation is de-
signed to deal with these sorts of problems. To
oversimplify abit, these historical situations were char-
acterized by a relatively small number ofhighly visible
problems. Not only were the problems easy to recog-
nize, but the solution was also easy to perceive. In gen-
eral the environmental exposure caused an acute disease
or reaction that was life-threatening, or at least inca-
pacitating. In general the problem occurred because
people were too short-sighted to foresee the conse-
quences of their actions. In a few cases, such as some
occupational exposures, employers argued that all but
a few trouble makers accepted these "conditions ofem-
ployment" and that it was impossible to continue pro-
duction without high levels of exposure.
Clearly, society had to correct unfortunate situations
that had not been anticipated and to head off disasters
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that were about to occur. The employers' arguments
wereshowntobeself-serving. Imaginativecontroltech-
nologies could lower exposure, changes in process could
cure the problem, or, failing all else, substitution of
materials would solve it. For example, beehive coke
ovens would be impossibly expensive to control, but
modern coke ovens achieve control with little economic
penalty. Controlling emissions from home coal fires is
impossibly difficult and expensive; it is easier to sub-
stitute natural gas or oil to solve the environmental
problems.
The Regulatory Approach to
Environmental Problems
These assumptions aboutthe natureofenvironmental
health problems were the basis offederal legislation in
the 1970s and of agency regulation. When Congress
instructed EPAinthe 1970CleanAirActAmendments,
they wanted primary air quality standards that would
protect the most sensitive group in the population with
an ample margin of safety; these standards were to be
achieved within seven years. Clearly, Congress did not
think that protecting the health of Americans from air
pollution was terribly difficult, expensive, or time-
consuming.
Perhaps Congress assumed solving environmental
health problems was simple. Perhaps Congress was mis-
led by staff and the experts who testified. More likely,L. B. LAVE
a group of Congressmen with no technical training or
appreciation of the problem assumed that if we could
getanAmericantothemoonwithinnineyears, wecould
solve environmental health problems within seven (1).
The agencies have been little better in approaching
the problems. When was the last time you heard the
Administrator ofEPA announce thatthe mostsensitive
group in the population could not be protected with an
ample margin ofsafety during this administration? When
was the last time you heard the administrator ofOSHA
telling a new conference that it simply was not possible
to "assure insofar as practicable that no employee will
suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or life ex-
pectancy as a result of his work."
To be sure, agency officials have been more forth-
coming at scientific meetings. I was on a program with
an EPA scientist in 1973 who asserted that there were
no thresholds for the effects of air pollutants and so
everyone could not be protected. But, if you were a
member of the general public, I can't think of a single
preface to a bill or agency news conference that told
youthatitwasn't that simple and thatwe weren'tgoing
to stop all discharges into the nation's waterways by
1985. The more relevant audience is not the general
public; it is federaljudges; they have been the arbiters
ofenvironmental health goals. When have these federal
judges been informed by Congress or agency adminis-
trators that this simple approach is not workable and
that the implied goals cannot be achieved?
Reality bears little resemblance to the assumptions
ofCongress in passingthis legislation. There are 60,000
chemicals in common use, with perhaps 1,000 new ones
added each year (2). There are millions of workplaces
and hundreds ofthousands ofprocesses. Instead ofbeing
able to regard each chemical as an independent chal-
lengetohealth, itisclearthatinteractions amongchem-
icals and between personal habits and genetic
predispositions on the one hand and environmental
agents on the other hand are of dominant importance
(3,4). Taking account of the interactions among chem-
icals and with personal habits and genetic predisposi-
tion, one would say that literally every person in every
setting presents a unique situation.
Foundations of the Regulatory Approach
The twin foundations of the current regulatory ap-
proach are (1) prevention rather than reacting after
initial loss and (2) a command and control system for
managing risk that leaves little or nothing to the ana-
lysis, motivation, andjudgment ofthose controlling the
risks. Both ofthese premises are subject to challenge.
There are so many possible risks that it is far from
obvious that important risks can be distinguished from
trivial ones before there is an untoward occurrence.
Problems plague the premanufacturing notice to EPA
for chemicals, the registration ofpesticides, and deter-
mining the proper standards for exposure to carcino-
gens. Giventhe difficulty and cost ofscreening allpossible
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hsks and then regulatmagthose that might induce loss,
it is far from obviounsthat an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure., Indeed, the cost-effectiveness
ratio of prevention seght be 16/1 rather than the 1/16
ofthe nostrum.
The secondfoundationissubjectto evengreaterchal-
lenge. Virtually all compliance with regulation is "vol-
untary,'" in the sense that no onecompels the individual
acts of compliance. For environmental emissions, the
failure to comply is unlikely to be detected and the vi-
olatoridentified. Forexample, whowouldknowifwork-
ers in a particular plant were being exposed to more
than 10 ppm of benzene? How long, if ever, would it
take to find this violation? If the violation were found,
what is the chance that a significant penalty would be
levied on these responsible?
There has been progress, as evidenced by the few
serious acute diseasescurrently causedby environmen-
tal emissions. Instead, attention has shifted to chronic
disease: cancers, chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease, and subtle effects on learning and development.
I don't mean to suggest these chronic diseases and con-
ditions are not of concern, only that it is more difficult
to find their cause and to prevent them.
However, it should be made clear that the progress
in cleaning the workplace and environment more gen-
erally is not due solely to federal regulation. With only
a few exceptions, the standards for toxic substances
enforced by OSHA were not developed by OSHA. In-
stead, they aretakenfromvoluntaryindustrystandards
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developed by ANSI and ACGIH. Studies of OSHA's
effect on occupational safety revealed little or no im-
provement that could be ascribed to federal standards
and their enforcement (5). Studies of air quality show
that federal standards have not been achieved and that
relativelymodestimprovementsoccurred inambientair
qualityforsulfuroxides, nitrogen oxides, and ozone (6).
The current reality is that OSHA has no hope of set-
tingstandards and enforcingthem forallenvironmental
agents in allworkplaces. EPA has nohope ofexamining
each new chemical to determine which are safe and which
should be excluded from the market. EPA has no hope
ofexamining each pesticide in each use to set individual
rules.
Thecurrent process worksbyselectingthebad actors
for agency attention and then setting a standard that
will protect health. The selection process has been ar-
bitrary and capricious, with priorities dictated by the
mediaratherthan anyobjective analysis ofwhichchem-
icals are most toxic and which involve the greatest ex-
posures. Thus, some problems such as vinyl chloride
monomer received no attention until disaster had oc-
curred (7), while immense attention is given to routine
emissionsfromnuclearreactors. Althoughthispointhas
been made many times in the past and agencies have
begun to structure priority setting, one would be hard
put to describe the efforts as successful.
Standard Setting
Standard setting is a problem (8). The general rule
is that standards should be set to prevent disease, sub-
ject only to the constraint that the standard be prac-
ticable (9). In Benzene (10), the Supreme Court added
the condition that an agency had to find that there was
a significant risk initially and that the standard would
reduce that risk. However, for carcinogens, where the
general assumption is that even a single molecule could
produce cancer, there is always a risk and there is no
risk level that is generally accepted to be insignificant.
For example, the risks associated with ambient levels
ofEDB are on the order of one cancer per 100,000,000
lifetimes; yet EDB risks prompted immediate action by
EPA and several states.
Thefactthatbenzenewon'tdisappear as apolicyissue
is indicative ofthe impossibility ofthe current standard
setting process. There is good evidence that benzene is
a leukemogen, but there are only rough guesses con-
cerning the dose-response relationship (11-13). Enor-
mous amounts oftime at OSHA, EPA, and CPSC have
been spent on preventing what would surely be only a
dozen or so cases of leukemia each year in the USA.
Without even countingthe cost ofreducing the benzene
exposures, the cost of preventing a case of leukemia
runs to millions of dollars in terms of squabbling ex-
penses alone.
IftheSupreme Courthadgiventhequantitativechar-
acterization of significant risk (that was then accepted
by the agencies, unions, consumer groups and Con-
gress), Benzene would have been an important prece-
dent. Withoutthat, thereisnohope ofgettingasensible
solutiontosettingstandards; theprocesswillinherently
be arbitrary and capricious.
Enforcement
Enforcement is perhaps even a greater problem than
standard setting (5,14,15). So few resources go into en-
forcement, and courts are so reluctant to impose fines
or criminal penalties that it is not unfairto characterize
compliance as voluntary. The principal pressures for
enforcement are public opinion and the desire of exec-
utives to lead a quiet life and obey the law. The various
estimates of compliance show that voluntarism is not
very strong.
Regulatory Reform?
The usual solution to these problems is to call for
appointing better people to the agencies, simplifying
procedures, increasing or cutting the agency budgets,
educating the public, subjecting regulations to OMB
review to see that net benefits are positive, or to
Congressional review to veto stupid decisions (16,17).
These have all been tried, with some administrators so
squeaky clean that even the media felt it could not crit-
icize the agencies-for a few weeks. Neither increasing
nor cutting agency budgets has had much effect on the
problems, however much of it affected the lives of the
staff. Educating the public is an enterprise with a time
constant of decades, not weeks, as EDB, Love Canal,
and Times Beach have shown. After four years of ex-
perience with Executive Order 12291, I hope I don't
astound you with the opinion that all major regulations
under the Reagan administration have not been para-
gons of thoughtful, nonpolitical reasoning.
Clearly there is a huge problem that has proven in-
tractable despite the best efforts of some very smart
people. The reforms proposed have been too little, too
misguided. None offers hope ofa solution, although some
might help improve agency decision making. I believe
that a more radical solution is required.
Nonregulatory Approaches
A more accurate characterization ofthe world is rep-
resented by the following propositions: (1) there are so
many risks and risk situations that regulation (or cen-
tralized risk management more generally) cannot hope
to deal explicitly with more than a tiny proportion; (2)
it follows that enforcement is so large a task that even
when some aspect ofrisk is subject to regulation, com-
pliance will be largely voluntary; and (3) in our compli-
cated world, there is no real hope of preventing first
cases ofloss; instead one can hope only to react quickly
to such cases and prevent future losses.
Given these three propositions, regulation has an im-
portant role in managing risk, but the role is quite dif-
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ferent fromwhat it currently does. Sinceregulation can
hope to address only atinyproportionofrisksituations,
it is important that the ones to be addressed are chosen
carefully. Two criteria should be used for selection: (1)
the situations to be addressed ought to be precedent-
setting in terms ofidentifying situations, setting goals,
and otherwise helping to structure the situation. Ifthe
regulatory agencies take care, their actions will have
vast leverage in influencing situations that they don't
have the time or resources to consider explicitly. (2)
The situations to be addressed should include genuine
national crises where much would be lost by failing to
act quickly.
But an even more importantrole offederalregulatory
agencies should be to monitor risk management more
generallyanddetermine hownonregulatoryinstitutions
can be helped to handle the vast majority of risk situ-
ations more satisfactorily and expeditiously. The reg-
ulatory agencies will contain the experts on risk, have
the goal of managing risks better, and have the re-
sources to monitor and analyze risk management. They
shouldhavetheroleofdeterminingwhennonregulatory
institutions are not working well and how they might
be modified (or new ones created) to manage risk more
efficiently. Again, this role seeks to leveragethe limited
efforts ofregulatory agencies to have much greater ef-
fects on society wide risk management.
Prior to the 1970s, virtually all environmental risks
were managed without regulation (18,19). While many
were neglected, there was some management for most
risks. For example, working in thick dust that made
youcoughandbecomesick wasnotviewed as adesirable
attribute of ajob. If a worker had a choice amongjobs,
he would choose the one without the apparent health
risks, unless that job offered a wage premium to com-
pensate for the working conditions. Similarly, people
did not care to live in areas with noxious air pollutants,
ifthey could find comparable housing in a nearby area
without the noxious pollutants. Thus employers learned
that they would have to pay higher wages to attract
quality workers if the working conditions were rela-
tively dangerous (5). Landlords learned thattheir prop-
erty values were hurt bypollution (20). Rememberthat
environmental cleanup inPittsburgh wasbrought about
by business leaders who believed that the "smoky city"
image was costly, despite the evident costs of abating
emissions.
There is much confusion about the assertion that pol-
lution lowers property values; after all, property is much
more expensive in the midst of a polluted city than in
the clean mountains. For an industrial area like Pitts-
burgh, more houses were rented and the rents were
higherwhenthe airpollution was worst. This is because
whentheairpollution was worst, themills wererunning
all three shifts and more people were employed and
earning more money. However, at any particular time
houses in clean neighborhoods rented for more than
houses in dirty neighborhoods (that were the same dis-
tance from the mills). Smoke does smell like jobs, but
somepeoplehavepollutedairwithoutjobsandthelucky
people have jobs without polluted air.
The Market
The market acts to control environmental pollution
bygivingemployers anincentive tocleanthe workplace
and landlords anincentivetogetthe pollutersto control
their emissions. The market doesn't workperfectly and
it won't do the whole job, but it did and can help.
Tort Law
Tort law is also a device for reducing environmental
pollution. Under English common law, one could sue
for nuisance. While there are contradictory outcomes,
there were cases which allowed individuals to collect
payment for their damages from polluters or to force
them to desist from polluting (21).
Voluntary Industry Standards
Athird device is voluntaryindustry standards. While
standardization was initially concerned with issues like
screw threads, ANSI and ACGIH got around to rec-
ommending standards for levels of dust and chemicals
in the workplace. While no company was required to
adhere to these standards, they were a force toward
lowering environmental emissions.
Insurance
A fourth device was insurance. If an insurance com-
pany had to pay foremployee disease, at the very least,
premiums would rise with awards. More generally, risk
averse insurance companies would tend to push an em-
ployerto curtail actions that might lead tolitigation and
awards, since outcomes are uncertain and the insurance
company cannot be sure it will be able to pass the costs
of all awards back to the offending company.
Other Approaches
Otherapproaches include collectivebargaining, licen-
sing, and public pressure. It is difficult to ascertain how
wellthese nonregulatinginstitutions managed to curtail
environmental emissions. On the one hand it is evident
thatthey did not stop all emissions. Toxicwastedumps,
air pollution, workplace hazards, and many unfortu-
nately occurrences are evidence of problems. On the
otherhand, environmentalemissions werecurtailedand
there was alimited numberofdisasters, such as London
and Denora, rather than an endless list of failures.
Clearly, there were problems that the new environ-
mentalregulations soughtto solve. However, Cong-mss
andthenewagenciestreatedtheotherinstitutionsman-
aging the environment with contempt and either ig-
nored them or shoved them aside to make room for
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regulatory control. In 1984 it is evident that regulation
is not a sufficient answer any more than the nonregu-
latory institutions. Now it is necessary to reevaluate
these nonregulatory institutions and determine what
role they can play and which ones should be used.
Criteria for Choosing Among
Approaches
Before doing that, it is necessary to discuss the cri-
teria for selecting one approach over another. The first
criterion is the environmental quality (or disease level)
that results. If the environmental quality that results
is unsatisfactory, some other approach must be tried.
However, the resultingenvironmental qualityisnotthe
onlycriterion. A second criterion is economic efficiency.
This criterion would judge an approach superior if the
amount of resources required to achieve the environ-
mental quality were less than that ofother approaches.
A third criterion is administrative simplicity. Even apart
from the total resources used, this criterion rewards
approaches that are simple and transparent, not re-
quinng an elaborate bureaucracy to administer. A fourth
criterion is equity. People want the right people to pay
and the right people to get the benefits.
To date, environmental policy has tended to focus on
environmental quality and equity, with little or no
thought to economic efficiency or administrative sim-
plicity. As might be expected, the result has been pro-
grams that are expensive, being both inefficient and
ineffective. Theresult has also been abyzantine system
requiring an elaborate bureaucracy, almost inevitably
leading to litigation, and requiring a burdensome pro-
cess ofannouncement, hearings, submissions and build-
ingup arecord. Focusingonenvironmental qualitywith
a small amount of attention to equity has left the ad-
ministrative approach needlessly expensive and
complicated.
Conclusion
A first recommendation would be to make changes in
the administrative approach that would make it both
more efficient and more effective. A more radical ap-
proach would be to change the regulatory process to
emphasize its leverage in using nonregulatory ap-
proaches to do most of the work. If so, there are two
principal roles that regulatory agencies might assume.
The first is to select a small number oftopics for scru-
tiny. These topics should be selected both to serve as
precedents fornonregulatory institutions and to handle
the really major catastrophes.
The secondmajorroleisto overseethenonregulatory
institutions. Since it is clear that these institutions will
be responsible for most risk management, it is impor-
tant that they be supervised to ensure that they are
effective and remain so. Thus, the regulatory agency
would attempt to see that the entire job gets done and
that each nonregulatory institution played its assigned
role effectively in managing environmental risks.
The key concept for regulatory reform is leverage.
The principal federal agencies have a total of perhaps
10,000 employees to determine the goals and enforce
standards for literally millions of risk situations. De-
tailed standards setting and enforcement for each risk
isimpossible, even ifagency budgets and staffwere ten
to one hundred times larger. The question is how cur-
rent resources can be levered by using nonregulatory
institutions.
This work was supported by a grant from the National Science
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